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Abstract 
This paper models a vertically-integrated provider that is a monopoly supplier of an input 
that is essential for downstream production. An input price that is “too high” can lead to 
inefficient foreclosure and one that is “too low” creates incentives for non-price 
discrimination. The range of non-exclusionary input prices is circumscribed by the input 
prices generated on the basis of upper-bound and lower-bound displacement ratios. The 
admissible range of the ratio of downstream to upstream price-cost margins is increasing 
in the degree of product differentiation and reduces to a single ratio in the limit as the 
products become perfectly homogeneous.   
 
1. Introduction  
In traditional infrastructure industries, including telecommunications, electric power and 
natural gas, it is common for an upstream monopolist to supply an input that is essential 
for downstream production. An input price that is “too high” can give rise to inefficient 
foreclosure,1 whereas an input price that is “too low” can induce the vertically-integrated 
provider (VIP) to engage in sabotage or non-price discrimination.2 The primary objective 
of this paper is to examine the role of product differentiation in circumscribing the range 
of non-exclusionary input prices.  
2. Notation and Definitions  
There is a single VIP that serves as a monopolist in the upstream input market and a 
single independent downstream provider. The downstream demand functions for the VIP 
and the independent provider are given by ( , )V V IQ P P  and ( , ),I I VQ P P where ,  iP i V  
and I denotes the respective downstream prices for the VIP and the independent rival. 
The downstream outputs of the VIP and the independent downstream provider are 
imperfect substitutes so that 0jiPQ   for ,i j V and I, ,i j where the subscripts denote 
partial derivatives. There are no income effects. 
                                                          
1 Weisman (2002) and Hausman and Tardiff (1995).  
2 Mandy and Sappington (2007) and Sibley and Weisman (1998). 
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 The price and constant marginal cost of the input are denoted by w and c, 
respectively. The production technology is fixed-coefficient: each unit of downstream 
output requires one unit of the VIP-supplied input and one unit of a complementary input. 
The cost of each unit of the complementary input is denoted by ,  is i V and I. Let 0d 
denote the increment by which the VIP raises the per-unit cost of its rival through non-
price discrimination. Finally, let ( )C d denote the cost of non-price discrimination for the 
VIP, with (0) 0,C   '(0) 0,C  '( ) 0, and ''( ) > 0 0.C d C d d    
 The profit functions for the VIP and the independent rival, which are assumed to 
satisfy standard regularity conditions that ensure a unique optimum, are given, 
respectively, by:  
 V I I V V V I V VQ P P w c Q P P P c s C d     ( , )[ ] ( , )[ ] ( ), and                 (1) 
   I I I V I IQ P P P w s d   ( , )[ ].                    (2)  
Assumption 1. , , , , .
i i
i j
Q Q i j V I i j
P P
      
Assumption 1 imposes the standard regularity condition that own-price effects dominate 
cross-price effects (Vives, 1999, p. 157). 
Definition 1. (Displacement Ratio)  
The displacement ratio is the absolute value of the change in the output of the 
independent rival associated with a one-unit increase in the output of the VIP (Armstrong 
et. al., 1996).   
 In the differentiated products setting under examination, there are two downstream 
prices and therefore two displacement ratios.  
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Lemma 1.  The upper-bound displacement ratio: .
I V
u I I
Q Q
P P
      
Lemma 2.  The lower-bound displacement ratio: .
I I I V
l V I V V
Q Q P Q
P P P P
           
 
Definition 2. (Product Homogeneity)  
The degree of product homogeneity is given by (0,1).l
u
     
Assumption 2. The displacement ratios, , , ,i i l u   are constants. 
The VIP is generally required by the antitrust or regulatory authority to satisfy a 
price floor (P-F) constraint. This constraint requires that the downstream price for the 
VIP be no lower than the incremental cost of providing downstream output plus the net 
contribution foregone (opportunity cost) in not providing the upstream input. The 
opportunity cost in this setting is computed on the basis of l because it is the change in 
the VIP’s price ( )VP  rather than the rival’s price ( )IP  that induces the change in the 
VIP’s output. This constraint requires that the lower-bound displacement ratio be no 
greater than the ratio of downstream to upstream price-cost margins (r).  
Definition 3. (P-F Constraint)  
1[ ] [ ] .
V V
V V V V
l l l
P c sP c s w c w c P c s r
w c
               
3 
An input price that is too low relative to the output price can give rise to non-price 
discrimination and underscores the need for a complementary, price-ceiling (P-C) 
constraint. This constraint requires that the upper-bound displacement ratio be no less 
than the ratio of downstream to upstream price-cost margins. 
                                                          
3 The input price that results when this last relation holds with equality is a form of the efficient component 
pricing rule or ECPR.  
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Definition 4. (P-C Constraint)  
1[ ] [ ] .
V V
V V V V
u u u
P c sP c s w c w c P c s r
w c
                 
The upper-bound displacement ratio ( u ) enters the analysis here because it is the 
change in the rival’s price ( IP ), triggered by the non-price discrimination and the 
resultant increase in its costs, that diverts demand from the rival to the VIP.    
A binding P-C constraint defines the lower bound input price, ,w and a binding P-F 
constraint defines the upper bound input price, .w    
Definition 5.  (Lower/Upper Bound Input Prices and Margin Ratios) 
a) The lower-bound input price (upper-bound margin ratio) is given by 
1 1( ) [ ]
V V
V V
u u u
P c sw c P c s r
w c
             .  
b) The upper-bound input price (lower-bound margin ratio) is given by 
1 1( ) [ ] .
V V
V V
l l l
P c sw c P c s r
w c
              
3. Formal Model 
The VIP and the independent rival compete in a three-stage, Bertrand-Nash game.4 In the 
first stage, the regulator chooses the input pricing rule, [ ],V Vw c k P c s    where k is 
the inverse displacement ratio. In the second stage, the VIP and the independent rival 
simultaneously choose profit-maximizing prices.  In the third stage, the VIP chooses the 
profit-maximizing level of non-price discrimination ( ).d   
The necessary first-order conditions for the second stage of the game are given by: 
                                                          
4 Weisman (2013) examines a similar problem in which the VIP is the leader and the rival is the follower.  
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[ ] ( , ) [ ] ( , ) 0;
V I V
I I V V V V V I
V V V V
Q w Qw c Q P P P c s Q P P
P P P P
                   (3) 
[ ( ) ] ( , ) 0.
I I
I I I I V
I I
Q P w d s Q P P
P P
                   (4) 
Lemma 3.  At the Nash equilibrium defined by (3) and (4), 
*
0
IP
d
  and 
*
0.
VP
d
   
 The first proposition establishes that the VIP does not engage in non-price 
discrimination for any input price that is greater than or equal to the lower-bound input 
price.  
Proposition 1. At the Nash equilibrium, * 0d  1 .uk w w     
 The second proposition establishes that the VIP engages in non-price discrimination 
for any input price that is strictly less than the lower-bound input price.  
Proposition 2. At the Nash equilibrium, * 0d  1 .uk w w     
The third proposition establishes that the VIP engages in neither type of market 
exclusion for input prices that satisfy both the P-F and P-C constraints.    
Proposition 3. The VIP does not engage in market exclusion 1 1[ , ] [ , ].u lk w w w
        
The fourth proposition reveals that the range of admissible margin ratios reduces to a 
single ratio in the limit as the degree of product differentiation vanishes.   
Proposition 4.  In the limit as 1, .r r    
Corollary 1. In the limit as 1,   the non-exclusionary margin ratio is unique and 
satisfies the “equal-margin rule.” 
The “equal-margin rule” requires that the input price be set so as maintain equality 
between the VIP’s retail and wholesale margins, or .V VP c s w c      
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 To facilitate a closed-form solution, we specify a linear demand system of the form 
( , ) .V V I V V V V IQ P P a b P g P                 (5) 
( , ) ,I I V I I I I VQ P P a b P g P                       (6) 
where , , , , , 0.V I V I V Ia a b b g g    
Proposition 5. The Nash-Equilibrium prices are given by 
 2 ( ( ) ( ) 2( )( ) ( )
( ) .
(3 ) 4
V
V I V V I V V I I
IV
I V
I V I V
I
ga c d s k s c g b k c s b g k a k
bP k
g gg g b k k b
b
          
 
   
          (7) 
and  
2
( ) ( ) ( 2 ) 2 ( ) ( )
( ) .
4 (3 )
V I I V I V I I I I I V V I I V
I
I V I V I I V
b kg c s b ck ks s b c d a b k a k a a a b
P k
b b b k k g g
g g
g g
               
  
  
    
(8) 
Proposition 6. The VIP’s Nash-Equilibrium profit function is given by  
 
2
22
( ) ( )( ) 2
( )
( ) ( 2 )
( ) ( ).
4 (3 )
I V I I I V I V I
V I
V I V I I V
V
I V I V I I V
a g b k b c d s g b k a b
b g k
c s g g b g k b
k C d
g g b b b k k g g
                  
     
    (9) 
 The following example illustrates the manner in which the range of non-exclusionary 
input prices varies with the degree of product differentiation. 
Example 1. The demand functions for the VIP and the independent rival are symmetric in 
(5) and (6) with 20, 2 and (0,2).V I V I V Ia a b b g g g        Also, 1.V Is s c  
The non-exclusionary input prices and margin ratios are shown below.5 
                                                          
5 Lemmas1 and 2 along with (5), (6) and (A7) imply that 
I
u V
b
g
   and 
1
2 2
1
[( ) 82 ] .IIl
I I Vg b bb g

       
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  g  1
u   1l     w  w  ( )VP w ( )VP w  r  r  r r
0.5 0.25 1.29 0.19 2.42 10.03 7.67 8.98 4.00 0.77 3.23 
1.0 0.5 1.19 0.42 5.50 15.13 11.00 13.91 2.00 0.84 1.16 
1.2 0.6 1.15 0.52 7.90 18.92 13.50 17.64 1.67 0.87 0.80 
1.4 0.7 1.11 0.63 11.97 25.21 17.67 23.87 1.43 0.90 0.53 
1.6 0.8 1.07 0.75 20.20 37.75 26.00 36.36 1.25 0.93 0.32 
1.8 0.9 1.03 0.87 45.10 75.29 51.00 73.84 1.11 0.97 0.14 
1.9 0.95 1.02 0.93 95.05 150.31 101.00 148.84 1.05 0.98 0.07 
 
4. Conclusion 
Market exclusion is a concern when input prices are “too high” because it can result in 
inefficient foreclosure as well as when input prices are “too low” because it can create 
incentives for sabotage. Upper/lower-bound displacement ratios are used to generate a 
range of non-exclusionary input prices. The admissible range of the ratio of downstream 
to upstream margins is increasing in the degree of product differentiation and reduces to a 
single ratio in the limit as the products become perfectly homogeneous. An important 
implication for competition policy is that both price-floor and price-ceiling constraints 
may be necessary to protect against market exclusion in certain settings.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1.  
( , ) .
V V
V I V V I
V I
Q QdQ P P dP dP
P P
 
    Set 1
VdQ   and 0,VdP  then 
1
.
V
I
I
QdP
P


    
 
( , ) .
I I
I I V V I
V I
Q QdQ P P dP dP
P P
 
    Set 0,
VdP  and substituting for IdP yields  
.
I I V
I I
I II
Q Q QdQ dP
P PP
  
   □  
Proof of Lemma 2.  
( , ) .
V V
V I V V I
V I
Q QdQ P P dP dP
P P
 
    Set 1
VdQ   and 0,IdP  then 
1
.
V
V
V
QdP
P


    
 
( , ) .
I I
I I V V I
V I
Q QdQ P P dP dP
P P
 
     
Recognizing that 
I
I V
V
PdP dP
P
  and substituting for 
VdP yields  
.
I I I I I I V
I V V
V I V VV I V
Q Q P Q Q P QdQ dP dP
P P P PP P P
      
     
      
□ 
Proof of Lemma 3.  
Totally differentiating (3) and (4) with respect to d yields the linear system :A X B    


2 2
2
2 2
2
0
.
A BX
V
V V
V V I
I I
I I
I V I
I
P
d
P P P
P QP P P
d P


                                             
 


                                                                         (A1) 
Sufficient second-order conditions for a maximum require that 
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2
2 0,
V
VP
  
2
2 0
I
IP
    and 
2 2 2 2
2 2 0.
V I V I
V I V I I VA P P P P P P
                
Appealing to Cramer's rule yields 
2 22 2
2 2
2 2
2
0 0
1 10, 0.
V VV I V I
I VV V IV I V I I
I I I I
I V I I I
Q Q
P PP P PP P P P P
d A A d A AQ Q
P P P P P
                          
    
 
since 
2
0
V
V IP P
    when prices are strategic complements. □ 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
From (1), the necessary first-order condition for d is given by 
 
 
: ( ) [ ]
( ) 0;  and  0.
I I I V V V V V I
V I V V
d I V V V I
V
V V
d
Q P Q P w P Q P Q Pw c Q P c s
P d P d P d P d P d
PQ C d d
d
                                  
       
(A2) 
Let 1,uk      where 0.   Substituting for 1
V I V I
u I I I I
Q Q Q Q
P P P P
       
      
along with 1( )[ ]V Vuw c P c s
       and (A2) yields 
1 1( )[ ] ( )
[ ] ( ) 0.
I I I V V
V V I
u uI V
V V V I V
V V V
V I
Q P Q P PP c s Q
P d P d d
Q P Q P PP c s Q C d
P d P d d
                     
                 
                               (A3) 
Rewrite (A3) in the following form:  
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[ ]
[ ] ( ) 0.
I I I V VV I V I
V V I
I I I II V
V V V
V V V
V
Q P Q P PQ Q Q QP c s Q
P P P PP d P d d
Q P PP c s Q C d
P d d
   
   
                                               
              
(A4) 
At an optimum for (1), 0VVP   or 
[ ]
[ ] 0.
I V I V I
V V I
I I I IV
V
V V V
V
Q Q Q Q QP c s Q
P P P PP
Q P c s Q
P
   
   


                          
    
                                (A5) 
Substituting (A5) into (A4) and appealing to Lemma 3 yields 
[ ] ( ) 0.
I I
V V
I
Q P P c s C d
P d 

          
                                                                        (A6)                              
Since 0,   (A6) implies that * 0d  by complementary slackness from (A2). □  
Proof of Proposition 2.  
From (A6), 0  implies that '( ) 0 * 0.C d d    □  
Proof of Proposition 3.   
By Proposition 1, * 0d  1 .uk w w      By Proposition 2, * 0d  1 .uk w w     
If 1lk    then w w  and the P-F constraint is violated. The result follows. □  
Proof of Proposition 4.  
1 1 and .ul r r      □  
Proof of Corollary 1.  
1 1.ul       Satisfaction of the P-C and P-F constraints requires that 
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1
V VP c s
w c
    and 1
V VP c s
w c
    1
V VP c s
w c
    ,
V VP c s w c    the “equal-
margin rule.” □ 
Proof of Proposition 5.   
Substituting for w in (4), appealing to (6) and solving for IP yields 
 [ ]
.
2
I I I V V V I
I
I
a b c d s k P c s P g
P
b
      
                                                         
(A7)
 
Substituting for w and IP along with solving (3) and (4) simultaneously for the linear 
system in (5) and (6) yields the Nash-equilibrium prices in (7) and (8). □ 
Proof of Proposition 6.  
Substituting (5) - (8) into (1) yields the VIP’s reduced-form profit function in (9). □ 
 
